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"Trafficking" in a Trade Mark
GEORGE ROLSTON *

"Traffic's thy god: and thy god confound thee."
(William Shakespeare, Taming of the Shrew, Act 1, Sc. 1, 1. 12)

The law of trade marks is generally understood to deal with the
buying and selling of goods in association with a trade mark. However, there is an important though somewhat obscure branch of
trade mark law dealing with buying and selling the trade mark
itself, which is frequently of far greater significance than the main
body of the law, particularly under modern business conditions in
Canada. These latter transactions are known (and sometimes stigmatised) as "trafficking" in a trade mark, and can often result in
such disastrous results to businessmen as to make the above quotation peculiarly apposite.
This article does not set out to deal with every case, British
and Canadian, on the topic, nor are all such cases cited in the footnotes. On the contrary, this article will attempt to suggest a
different approach to the leading cases from that which has been
made in the past. Furthermore, the word "trafficking" is generally
taken to imply some kind of illegal or improper dealings but this
article will deal both with such improper dealings in trade marks
and will also attempt to indicate what dealings in a trade mark are
regarded as proper by law.
It should be noted at the outset that the old common law rules
were radically changed by the Trade Marks Act of 19531 when
changes were made, similar to those made in the British Trade
Marks Act of 1938,2 and these provisions will be dealt with later.
For convenience this article will therefore be divided into three
parts. The first part deals with the common law prior to 1953
which is still of importance in considering this topic. The second
part will touch briefly on the various exceptions to the common
law, and the third part will discuss the changes made in 1953. The
reason for this somewhat elaborate discussion lies in the fact that
in order to take advantage of the 1953 provisions, the Statute must
be complied with from the very beginning of any arrangement, and
in many cases it is ignored until trouble looms on the horizon, at
which point it is too late to put matters right.
Mr. Rolston is a barrister-at-law of the Middle Temple, and took his LL.B.
at University College, London. He is at present in the third year at
Osgoode Hall Law School.
The Canadian Trade Marks Act, 1953, 1-2 Eliz. II, c. 49.
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A
Priorto 1953

On the question of improper dealings
or "trafficking" in trade
3
marks, it has been said, for example, that:
The object of the (trade marks) law is to preserve for a trader the
reputation he has made for himself, not to help him in disposing of that
reputation as of itself a marketable commodity, independent of his goodwill, to some other trader.

Indeed in earlier times it was thought that a man's trade mark
or trade name could not be used even by his direct successors in
business, since his custom and goodwill depended on his personal
skill. However, at least since 1863 it has been the law both in
England and in Canada, that a trade mark could be treated as a
constituent part of the property of a business and that it could be
leased (licensed) and sold (assigned) with the business, subject to
certain very important limitations which will be discussed. This
general principle was recognized in the leading case of Leather Cloth
Co. v. The American Leather Cloth Co.4 where Lord Cranworth
stated:
The right to a trade mark may in general treating it as property or an
accessory of property be sold and transferred upon the sale or transfer
of the manufactory of the goods on which the mark has been used to
be affixed and may lawfully be used by the purchaser.

The limitations placed upon this general proposition were in
fact much more important than the proposition itself and in turn
subject to certain exceptions. The general basis of such limitations
lies in the fundamental principle that a trade mark must not be
allowed to confuse or mislead the public. If a trader permitted
his trade mark to be used in a confusing manner the penalty imposed by the Courts was simply to refuse to prevent other traders
from copying or "infringing" his mark (and thus indirectly giving
their blessing to almost unlimited passing off-but that is another
story).
This rule can be stated conversely in the terms that a trade
mark can have existence only insofar as it is distinctive of the
goods (or services) of a particular trader or of a particular "brand"
of goods, etc., where the trader is undisclosed. When a trade mark
ceases to be distinctive it is no longer a trade mark. If registered
it becomes liable to be expunged from the Register as an "invalid"
trade mark. If unregistered the effect will be to render an action
for passing off useless. Prior to 1953 a trade mark could lose distinctiveness in a number of different ways. 5 Of these, two are of
2 The British Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. VI, c. 22.
3 Bowden Wire Ltd. v. Bowden Brake Co. Ltd. (1913), 30 R.P.C. 45, (1914)
31 R.P.C. 385.
4 (1863), 4 De G., J. & S. 137; 32 L.J. Ch. 721; 33 L.J. Ch. 199; 35 L.J. Ch.
53; 1 H. & M. 271; (1865), 11 H.L.C. 523; 11 Jure. N.S. 513.
5 Kerly on Trade Marks and Trade Names, 7th ed., chapter 14.
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importance here. They are in fact the improper licensing of the
trade mark and the improper assignment of it, resulting in use of
the trade mark in a confusing manner. Under the common law an
assignment of a trade mark was regarded as improper if it did not
also assign the whole of the goodwill in the business in which the
trade mark was used and of which it formed a constituent and
valuable portion. Similarly, a licence to use a trade mark was
regarded as improper if it did not also, in effect, licence the goodwill in the business, the reason being that a trader should not be
permitted to carve up his reputation and sell portions of it to
different persons, or to sell part and keep the remainder.
This is by no means the whole story, however. In many cases
an improper licence or assignment was made which was in fact
never acted upon with the result that the trade mark never lost its
distinctiveness or became confusing in any way.
The cases are not always easy to follow. For example, in a
number of cases the Courts have been able to settle the matter
before them by merely holding that the assignment (or licence)
was improper or "invalid" and therefore ineffective to transfer the
trade mark, with the result that the assignee or licencee was divested
of his title and therefore lost the action. In these cases there may
or may not have been evidence of substantial use of the mark by
the assignee or licensee, but the Court has frequently been able to
escape the question of whether the trade mark itself was no longer
distinctive and hence invalid by merely deciding the question of title.
For the sake of illustration a list of some cases in which the
court has taken this approach has been prepared though it is not
suggested that this is exhaustive. 6 Furthermore, it is of interest to
note when reading through the cases on assignments and licences
that in fact only a fraction have resulted in a finding of invalidity,
and a sample list of such cases is also offered for comparison. 7
Some of the difficulties of the cases undoubtedly arise from the
terminology. Thus it is common to find statements that "a trade
mark cannot be assigned in gross", i.e., without the good will in
the business. A corresponding statement concerning licences is that
"licensing invalidates a trade mark".
Taken at face value these isolated phrases do appear to offer
support for the proposition that the mere existence of an improper
licence or assignment whether acted on or not is sufficient to invalidate a trade mark. Criticism has been directed against the
harshness of such a rule, and it is difficult to see any logical basis
6Pinto v. Badman (1891), 8 R.P.C. 181; Re SincZair (John) Ltd.'s Trade
Mark (1932), 49 R.P.C. 123; Re Roger's Trade Mark (1895), 11 R.P.C. 637;
Mello-Creme Products v. Ewan's Bread Ltd. et a7., [1930] Ex. C.R. 124.
7 Bowden case, supra, footnote 3; Boussod, Valadon & Co. v. Marchant
(1907), 24 R.P.C. 665; (1908), 25 R.P.C. 42; Lacteosote Ltd. v. Alberman
(1927). 44 R.P.C. 211; Crean (Robert) & Co. Ltd. v. Dobbs & Co., [1929] Ex.

C.R. 164; [1930] S.C.R. 307.
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for its application.8 The writer is in complete agreement with such
criticism but goes further and submits with respect that in fact no
case has been decided in which such a rule has been enforced.
Indeed, from the few cases which deal squarely with the issue of
invalidity it appears that they are consistent in requiring that the
licence or assignment must have been acted upon so as to result
in actual confusion or deception by use before it will render the
trade mark invalid. 9
On the point of licensing probably the best known case is that
of Bowden Wire Limited v. Bowden Brake Co. Limited,'0 which
went to the House of Lords, in which all four Law Lords held
that the trade mark had lost its distinctiveness. The facts in this
case were briefly that the Bowden Wire Company was the "parent"
company and the Bowden Brake Company was its "subsidiary".
The Wire Company had a number of patents and had two registered trade marks. The Wire Company licensed the Brake Company
under the patents to manufacture certain components for use solely
on pedal cycles and at the same time licensed the Brake Company
to use the two trade marks in association with these goods. The
Wire Company continued to trade on its own behalf in the field of
motor cycle components and used the same two trade marks in
association with its goods. After some years of trading on this
basis a dispute arose between the two companies which led to this
litigation with the result that the two trade marks of the Wire
Company were held to have lost their distinctiveness and were ordered
to be struck off the Register of Trade Marks. The opinions of their
Lordships are of commendable brevity, that of Earl Loreburn being

as follows:"
I have had the advantage of seeing in print the opinion of Lord
Dunedin. I agree with his conclusions and accordingly need say very little.
The Appellants have misconceived, or at all events misused, the protection which the law gives to a Trade Mark. The object of the law Is
to preserve for a trader the reputation he has made for himself, not to
help him in disposing that reputation as of itself a marketable commodity, independent of his goodwill, to some other trader. If that were
allowed, the public would be misled, because they might buy something
in the belief that it was the make of a man whose reputation they knew,
whereas it was the make of someone else. All this is elementary, and
I only state it because a long argument was addressed to us in support
of the proposition that the registration of a Trade Mark implies no
representation to the public at all.
In this case the Appellants parcelled out the right to use their
Trade Mark as if they had been dealing with a Patent. The particulars
of the distribution are not important. It is enough that they enabled
or allowed people, who were not registered for it, to use the Trade
Mark on a substantial scale for their make of a description of goods
dealt with habitually in the same class of business. I think the appeal
should be dismissed.
8 H. G. Fox, Trade Mark Assignments and Licenses in Canada, 35 T.M.R.
7; C. Robinson, Use of Trade Marks in Canada by Canadian Subsidiaries of
Foreign Companies, 5 C.P.R. 86.
on Trade Marks, 6th ed., 425.
190Kerly
Bowden case, supra, footnote 3.
11 Ibid., at p. 392.
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An example of a case on the question of an improper assignment is that of Lacteosote Ltd. v. Alberman.12 In this case a French
manufacturer made a cough mixture in France, to which he applied
a distinctive trade mark, part of which was the name "Sirop Famel".
He registered the trade mark in England and sold large quantities
of the mixture both in France and in England. After about 17
years the French manufacturer assigned the whole of the English
business in his cough mixture to the plaintiff, Lacteosote Ltd.
Lacteosote did not manufacture the cough mixture but merely imported the product from France, and about a year later Lacteosote
registered virtually the same trade mark with the descriptive written
matter translated into English. Soon afterwards Alberman bought
the French manufacturer's cough mixture in France and sold it in
England under the French version of the Trade Mark. Lacteosote
sued Alberman for infringement of its trade mark, and Alberman
pleaded by way of defence that the trade mark was "invalid" because the assignment was improper and the subsequent use under
the assignment rendered the trade mark deceptive. It was held by
Clauson J. that the assignment from the French manufacturer to
Lacteosote was improper because it did not assign the whole of
the French manufacturer's business in England but only assigned
the importing and selling part of the business. The assignment did
not therefore pass the whole of the goodwill in the business but
only a portion of it, leaving the remainder in the French manufacturer and under the then existing doctrine this was regarded as
improper.' 3 The subsequent use made by Lacteosote of the trade
mark was held to be deceptive and accordingly the trade mark was
ordered to be struck off the Register.
In both cases the judgments referred specifically to two basic
constituents, namely:
(a) The existence of rights to use the trade mark in two persons (in
the case of the Licence), and the severance of the rights in the
goodwill from the rights in the trade mark between two persons
(in the case of the Assignment).
(b) The exercise by both persons of their respective rights on a substantial scale.
The Canadian cases on this topic have in fact followed the same
logical principle and thus for example in Moyer v. Holland'4 the
Court held that in order to invalidate a trade mark the assignment
must have been acted upon. Similarly, in Peggy Sage Inc. v. Siegel
Kahn Co. of Canada Ltd.,' 5 McLean J. summarized the effect of the
Bowden Wire decision in the following words:
12

Lacteosote case, supra,footnote 7.

13 This particular principle is probably no longer good law in view of the

changes introduced in the Trade Marks Act, supra,footnote 1, secs. 47 and 48,
but at that time it was a necessary result of the application of the common
law.
14 [19331 Ex. C.R. 217.
3-5 [19351 Ex. C.R. 70; [1935] S.C.R. 539.
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The principle deducible from the decision of the House of Lords, applicable to the controversy here, is, in my opinion, that a licensing of a trade
mark in gross, as the phrase goes, and the use of that mark by an
unregistered licencee, on goods manufactured and marketed by such
licencee as his goods, and not those of the registered owner of the mark,
vitiates the registered mark, in the Bowden case, the first registered
mark.

Again, in Battle Creek, etc. v. Kellogg, etc.,16 Ferguson J. A. said:
I find as a fact that the contract of sale was not intended or calculated
to, and its (the trade mark's) use by the Plaintiffs in Canada did not
deceive or mislead the public as to the origin or manufacture of the goods
offered for sale by the Plaintiffs. . . . There is no evidence that they
thereby deceived their customers or the public....

The issue does not appear to have been dealt with directly in
the more recent English cases, perhaps because the British Trade
Marks Act has been in force since 1938 and the advantages available
under its provisions are more familiar and more widely used.
It is therefore of considerable interest to compare the latest
pronouncements on this subject by the House of Lords on the one
hand and the Exchequer Court of Canada on the other, both in 1959.
The Canadian case is that of Siscoe Vermiculite Mines Ltd. v. Munn
and Steele Inc.'-7 the facts of which were that the Respondent,
Munn and Steele, was a United States corporation and had a Canadian trade mark registration "Mfficaffil" which at some time in the
past it had licensed to the Petitioner, Siscoe Vermiculite. By this
action the Petitioner sought to expunge the registration of the
Respondent from the Trade Mark Register on the grounds, inter
alia, that the mark had become publici Juris by reason of the licence
granted by the Respondent to the Petitioner. On the question of
licensing, it was held by Thurlow J. that there had been a licensing
of the trade mark by the Respondent to the Petitioner and furthermore that the Petitioner had made use of the trade mark to a
limited extent. However, he declined to hold that the trade mark
had thereby become liable to be expunged on the ground that there
was no evidence before him that the use by the Petitioner had
resulted in public confusion. This case is therefore authority for
the proposition that it is the use of the trade mark which invalidates
it and not the mere licensing of it.
The English case is that of T. Oertli AG. v.E. J. Bowman (London) Ltd. et al.,'8 the facts of which were that the Plaintiff company
manufactured mixers in Sweden and sold them in Great Britain
under the name "Turmix". In 1948 the Plaintiff licensed the Defendants under certain British patents to manufacture the mixers in
Great Britain and to sell them under the name "Turmix", which
was in fact registered as a trade mark in the name of the Plaintiff
company. The Defendant carried on under this arrangement until
about 1952 when a dispute arose, shortly after which the Defen16

54 O.L.R. 537; [1923) 4 D.L.R. 543 (Ont. C.A.).

17 (1959), 31 C.P.R. 6; (1959), 18 Fox Pat. C. 160; [1959] Ex. C.R. 455.

IS [1956] R.P.C. 282; [1959) R.P.C. 1.
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dant made certain changes in the mixers and changed the name
from "Turmix" to "Magimix". The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for
passing off its mixers as and for those of the Plaintiff, alleging as
part of their case that the name "Magimix" was confusing with the
name "Turmix". The Plaintiff did not attempt to sue for infringement of its registered trade mark, nor did the Defendant attempt
to invalidate the trade mark or prove loss of distinctiveness, by
reason of the licensing agreement. It was held by the House of
Lords that the Defendant had not passed off its mixers for those
of the Plaintiff and accordingly the Plaintiff lost the action. However, in the course of his judgment, Viscount Simmonds commented
on the issue of licensing when he made certain observations as to
the failure of the Plaintiff to sue for infringement of its registered
trade mark, and concluded that such failure was due to the fact
that the trade mark had become invalid by reason of the licence.
He then went on to deal at length with the issue of passing off,
and the question of whether the mark was in fact distinctive of
the Plaintiff's mixers. It is noteworthy that in order to establish
a case of passing off it is necessary for a Plaintiff to prove that
the trade mark he uses on his goods is in fact well known to the
public and is distinctive of his goods, i.e., identifies them and sets
them apart from similar goods of other traders. This is unnecessary in the statutory action for infringement of a registered trade
mark and the statutory remedy is therefore preferable, involving as
it does a lower burden of proof. It is clear, however, that the licensing of a trade mark so that it actually loses distinctiveness is equally
fatal both to the statutory right and to the common law right, since
the effect is the same in either case. In the light of these considerations it is therefore difficult to understand what persuaded the
Plaintiff to waive its rights under the statute and merely to rely
on the common law passing off action, though possibly the Plaintiff
may have had further reasons for doubting the validity of its trade
mark registration, quite apart from the issue of licensing. Such
problems, however, lead to some further difficulties in following the
opinions of their Lordships. For example, Viscount Simmonds, when
dealing with this issue observed that the trade mark registration was
not relied upon presumably because it had become invalid by reason
of the licensing. He then examined the evidence offered in support
of the passing off case, and eventually concluded that the Plaintiff
had failed to prove distinctiveness. However, if Viscount Simmonds
was right in his presumption that the trade mark registration was
invalid for licensing, then a fortiori, the passing off action failed
since it involved attempting to prove distinctiveness affirmatively,
and in fact distinctiveness had been lost by reason of the licensing
of the trade mark. From the report of the case, however, it is clear
that the issue of licensing was not raised, and so the question of
whether the trade mark, registered or unregistered, had lost its distinctiveness for this reason was not in fact squarely before the
Court. The remarks of His Lordship on the invalidity of the regis-
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tered trade mark must therefore be treated as obiter and as of no
authority for the proposition that mere licensing of a trade mark,
without more, results in invalidity.
In conclusion, therefore, it would seem that the rule is well
established, at least in Canada, that when an assignment or licence
of a trade mark, whether registered or unregistered, has been made,
which in fact has resulted in public confusion or deception, then
that trade mark loses distinctiveness and becomes unenforceable
either under the statute or at common law.
Conversely, where an assignment or a licence has been executed,
but the trade mark has not been used by virtue thereof so as to
cause confusion or deception then the trade mark does not lose
its distinctiveness, whether in fact the assignment or licence was
one which the law regards as improper or not.
PART B
Exceptions to the GeneraZ Rues-Priorto 1953
Exhaustive discussions of the various exceptions made by the
Courts to the general rules relating to assignments and licences of
trade marks will be found elsewhere, 1 9 and it is not for the writer
to attempt to improve on them here. Rather, I will merely comment
on some of the cases to see whether they support the general principle set out under Part A above or whether in fact they are true
exceptions to it.
The exceptions are generally said to be found in cases where there
is an agency relationship, and also where the arrangement is between either related or associated companies.
1. Agency
In a true case of an agency relationship between say, a manufacturer-owner of a trade mark and a retailer, there is no difficulty.
The retailer may in fact enter into an agency agreement with the
manufacturer which may include a licence of the trade mark which,
by itself, the law would regard as improper. It is well established,
however, that whether with or without such licence the retaileragent has every right to sell the goods of the manufacturer-principal,
0
in the normal course of trade, under the manufacturer's trade mark.2
Such use by the retailer involves no misrepresentation to the public
since the retailer is neither selling his own goods as those of some
other person nor is he selling some other person's goods as his own.
The existence of a licence of the trade mark does not alter this
position. This much is clear.
It is, however, important to make the distinction between the
validity of the licence and the validity of the trade mark. While
19Kery on Trade Marks, 7th ed.; H. G. Fox, Canadian Law of Trade
Marks and Unfair Competition, 2nd ed.
20 Ooles (J. H.) ProprietaryLtd. v. Need (1933), 50 R.P.C. 379.
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there is no doubt that such use by the retailer-agent does not invalidate the trade mark, it would seem to follow that if the licence is
itself improper, the retailer-agent acquires no title to the trade mark
and no right to enforce the mark himself.
This exception will therefore be seen to be in accord with the
basic principle I have examined under Part A. The leading Canadian
case in which it is relied upon, is that of Seigel Kahn v. Peggy Sage,21
where McLean J., after summarizing the effect of the Bowden Wire
case, went on to examine the facts of the case before him. Briefly,
Peggy Sage Inc., a United States company, had registered the trade
mark "Peggy Sage" in the United States and in Canada. Peggy Sage
Inc. entered into an agreement with N.W. Limited, a Canadian
company, making it the exclusive manufacturing and selling agent
in Canada of Peggy Sage Inc., and giving it the right to use the
trade mark "Peggy Sage" on such goods. Seigel Kahn then registered the trade mark "Peggy Royal" in respect of similar goods,
and later sought to have the trade mark "Peggy Sage" expunged
from the Register on the grounds that (a) by the agreement the
Respondent, Peggy Sage Inc., had parted with its rights to such
trade mark in Canada and the same had thereby become vitiated,
and (b) that dealers and users were led to believe that the goods
made and sold by N.W. Limited were the goods of Peggy Sage Inc.
On these facts McLean J. held that N.W. Limited manufactured the
goods in Canada as agent for Peggy Sage Inc. and applied the trade
mark "Peggy Sage" to such goods on its behalf. Accordingly, in
McLean J.'s judgment there was no confusion or deception, since
the public was not led to believe that the goods were any other
than those of Peggy Sage Inc.
It is not entirely clear why McLean J. thought that this arrangement did not give rise to deception and confusion. In fact it would
seem to be equally confusing whether the public connects the goods
with the owner of the trade mark, or whether it connects them
with the licencee of the mark, provided a possibility of confusion
does exist by reason of the use of the mark by two different people.
In fact it would be hard to distinguish this case from that of the
Bowden Wire case, were it not for this very factor. In the Bowden
Wire case the two companies were located in the same country,
Great Britain, and both sold goods in that country under the same
mark. In Seigel Kahn v. Peggy Sage the two companies were located
in different countries, namely, Peggy Sage Inc. in the United States
and N.W. Limited in Canada, and they sold their goods in their
respective countries. In the result, in the Bowden Wire case, the
public in Great Britain had similar goods offered to them, bearing
identical marks and manufactured by two different persons, and
were thereby confused. In Seigel Kahn the Canadian public had the
goods of N.W. Limited offered to it exclusively, without the possibility of confusing them with the goods of Peggy Sage Inc., and
21
Supjra, footnote 15.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

(VOL. 2:39

were therefore not confused. It would therefore seem reasonable to
suggest that this case is authority for the proposition that even
where Company A is licensed by Company B to use B's trade mark,
and A does so use it, the trade mark will not lose distinctiveness as
long as all the goods available bearing that mark in that country
in fact emanate from the one company, A.
However, it is suggested that the case of agency is nonetheless
an eminently reasonable exception to make, and should be equally
applicable to a situation where a principal appoints a number of
agents to manufacture its goods and sell them under its mark, all
within the same jurisdiction, provided a true agency relationship
exists.
A special case of agency may exist in the case of a patent
licence agreement. It quite frequently occurs that where a company
grants a licence under a patent to another company a term of the
licence agreement is that the licensee will sell the goods it manufactures under the patent licence under the registered trade mark
of the owner of the patent. This is what in fact occurred in the
case of A. Manus v. R. J. Fulwood and Bland Ltd.2 2 the facts of
which were somewhat similar to the case already mentioned of
T. Oertli AG. v. Bowman, and were briefly that the Plaintiff was a
Swedish company manufacturing milking machines and it sold its
machines in Great Britain under the name "Manus". On the outbreak of hostilities in September, 1939, it became impossible for the
Swedish company to continue to export its goods to Great Britain
and accordingly it sought to make alternative arrangements. Such
arrangements included the licensing of its importing agent, the
Defendant in this case, to manufacture the milking machines under
the Plaintiff's British patents, and to sell them in Britain under
the trade mark "Manus", this last provision of the agreement being
mandatory on the Defendant. The Defendant continued to manufacture throughout the period of the war. After the war the Swedish
manufacturer sought to re-enter the British market with its own
machine, and therefore terminated the arrangements with the Defendants. However, the Defendants continued to manufacture and
sell and accordingly the Plaintiff brought this action to restrain
them from selling milking machines under the trade mark "Manus".
The Defendants resisted this action on the grounds, inter alia, that
the term in the patent licence requiring it to place the name "Manus"
on all milking machines manufactured by it and sold in Great Britain
in fact amounted to a licensing of the registered trade mark, which
therefore lost distinctiveness and became unenforceable. However,
the Court did not accept this defence and held that the arrangement
did not amount to licensing of the trade mark so as to cause it to
lose distinctiveness, but was merely an arrangement made by the
Plaintiff to keep its name before the public during the war, when it
could no longer do so on its own behalf. This arrangement will be
22 (1948), 65 R.P.C. 329.
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seen to be in fact very similar to that in the Bowden Wire case noted
above, and indeed, as Dr. Fox put it:2
It is somewhat difficult to see wherein an obligation to use a trade mark,
which does not invalidate it, differs from a permission to use a trade
mark, which carries invalidity with it.
It is suggested, however, that the reason that the trade mark was
not invalid by reason of the licensing in this case is similar to that
obtaining in the Seigel Kahn case, namely, that there was in fact no
possibility of confusion in the minds of the general public because,
at no time, were there two persons using the same mark on similar
goods in the same country.
2.

Related Companies

The exception under this heading is by no means so easy to
support as that under the heading of Agency. It is said that where
Company A owns a trade mark and licenses it to subsidiary or
related companies, Al, A2, etc., over which it exercises substantial
control, and such trade mark is in fact used, then the licence is not
objectionable since the companies are related and therefore are all
one organization. The case in which this proposition was put forward is that of Good Humour Corporation of America v. Good
Humour Food Products Ltd. et al.24 The facts were, briefly, that
the Plaintiff, Good Humour Corporation of America, owned many
subsidiary companies in the United States, and it owned the registered trade mark "Good' Humour" in the United States and in
Canada. Under a franchise agreement it leased its rights under the
trade mark in the United States to its subsidiary companies, which
were in fact located exclusively in the United States. The company
did not apparently do business in Canada at all. The Defendant,
Good Humour Food Products Ltd., was a Canadian company and
subsequently registered the trade mark "Good Humour" in Canada
for a somewhat different classification of goods. The Plaintiff sued
the Defendant for infringement of its registered trade mark in
Canada, and the Defendant relied, inter alia, on the fact that the
Plaintiff had licensed its trade mark to a number of other companies and that it had therefore lost distinctiveness. It was held
by Anger J. that the licensing of the trade mark "Good Humour"
by the Plaintiff to its subsidiaries did not affect the validity of
the mark because the Plaintiff and its subsidiaries constituted one
organization and that in the result the public was not confused.
It is not clear whether the learned Judge thought that the fact
that the companies were related to one another in some way deprived
them of their independent legal personality, or whether the "one
organization" had some kind of independent legal personality of its
own, either of which propositions would appear to offer interesting
possibilities for research to students of Company Law.
23 H. G. Fox, op. cit., footnote 19, vol. 1, 394.
24 [19371 Ex. C.R. 61.
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It is submitted, however, that it was unnecessary to put forward any such proposition in this case. The Good Humour Corporation of America and its subsidiaries traded exclusively in the U.S.A.
The operation of a franchise agreement of this type in that country
is the accepted practice and is apparently free from objection under
U.S. law. No business was ever done in Canada in this manner,
though the trade mark "Good Humour" was apparently registered
in Canada. It therefore follows that nothing was ever done in Canada
in the way, either of licensing the trade mark, or of using the trade
mark under a licence, and therefore the trade mark would not have
lost whatever distinctiveness it may have had.
Further doubt is cast upon this decision by the earlier case in
the Supreme Court of Canada, of Crean v. Dobbs,25 the facts of
which were, briefly, that the Petitioner, Dobbs and Company, was
a retailer of hats and was a subsidiary company of another U.S.
corpoiation which manufactured hats. Dobbs and Company registered the trade mark "Dobbs" for hats which were manufactured
for it by the manufacturing company. The manufacturing company
also sold hats under the name "Dobbs" in various other parts of the
United States, and exported them into Canada through an agent.
About ten years later the Respondent, Robert Crean and Company
Ltd., a Canadian company, registered the trade mark "Dan Dobbs"
for hats in Canada and some time later this petition was brought
by Dobbs and Company to expunge the registration. It was held
by the Supreme Court of Canada that the prior user of the mark
"Dobbs" by the U.S. manufacturing company on hats sold in Canada,
prevented the Respondent, Crean, from registering the trade mark
"Dan Dobbs" for hats, and accordingly its registration was ordered
to be expunged. However, the Supreme Court of Canada also held
that the arrangement between Dobbs and Company and its parent
manufacturing corporation amounted to licensing of its trade mark
which accordingly lost distinctiveness. In particular, it is of interest
that the Supreme Court of Canada held that the use in Canada by
the parent corporation was not the same as use by the subsidiary
and that the two companies were separate and distinct legal entities,
in spite of the fact that one was the subsidiary of the other.
In view of this decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is
submitted that little reliance can in fact be placed upon the Good
Humour case, and that if it is desired to license a trade mark between parent and subsidiary companies in Canada this should be
done in the manner provided for by the statute.
PART C
The Trade Marks Act, 1953
By sections 47, 49 and 50 the Canadian Trade Marks Act of
1953 has virtually abolished the restrictions on assignments of trade
25 Supra, footnote 7.
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marks, and has introduced a form of statutory license by means of
which the use of a trade mark may be licensed to another person or
persons without becoming invalid, and this part of my Article will
be divided accordingly.
1.

Assignments
Section 47(1)-A trade mark, whether registered or unregistered, is
transferable, and deemed always to have been transferable, either in connection with or separately from the
good will of the business and in respect of either all or
some of the wares or services in association with which
it has been used.
Section 47(2)-Nothing in subsection (1) prevents a trade mark from
being held not to be distinctive if as a result of a transfer
thereof there subsisted rights in two or more persons to
the use of confusing trade marks and such rights were
exercised by such persons.

There have been as yet no decisions on this section and accordingly its precise effect is a matter of conjecture. However, the
writer suggests that as far as the question of the validity of the
trade mark assigned is concerned, it has effected little change in
the law. Prior to 1953 the trade mark was invalid only if the assignment had been acted upon. This is in fact what subsection (2) of
section 47 says.
As far as the effect of the assignment is concerned, it is clear
that since 1953 mere failure to assign the good wil does not prevent
title from passing to the assignee, a provision that has been welcomed as freeing businessmen from the obstructive provisions of
outmoded rules, and its effect can only be beneficial.
A comparison with the equivalent provisions in the British
Trade Marks Act 1938 is instructive. Section 22 of the Trade Marks
Act 1938 deals exclusively with the form and effect of the assignment, and only in subsection (4) is there any reference to the effect
of the use of the trade mark under the assignment, and even here
the reference is to the "existence of rights in two persons" rather
than the "exercise of rights by two persons" as in the Canadian Act.
Section 22(1)-Notwithstanding any rule of law or equity to the contrary, a registered trade mark shall be, and shall be
deemed always to have been, assignable and transmissible
either in connection with the goodwill of a business or not.
Section 22(4)-A trade mark shall not be assignable if, as a result of
the assignment, there would subsist exclusive rights in
more than one of the persons concerned to the use of
trade marks which would be likely to deceive or cause
confusion.
In particular, it is to be observed that section 22 neither restates nor abolishes the common law rule relating to the validity of
the trade mark assigned, which accordingly is still applicable, in fact
in much the same terms as those of section 47(2) of the Canadian
Trade Marks Act.
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Other differences between the equivalent Canadian and British
provisions are also of interest. Thus the Canadian provisions apply
both to registered and unregistered or "common law" trade marks,
whereas the British Act applies only to registered trade marks
(except in the special circumstances of subsection (3)), thus leaving the situation unchanged as regards the majority of unregistered
trade marks. The British Act also provides for registration of the
assignment on the Trade Marks Register after approval by the
Registrar of Trade Marks (section 22(5)), whereas the Canadian
Act contains no effective provision for approval, or refusal, by a
Registrar beyond the formal requirements of section 47(3).
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Canadian provisions as
to assignments are probably of much greater benefit to the business
community than the corresponding British provisions, while yet
retaining safeguards against abuse which are at least as effective as
those contained in the British Act.
2.

Licensing

The statutory licence was first brought into being by the British
Trade Marks Act of 1938, and, when the British draftsmen sought
to relieve the restrictive rules of the common law, one of their
happier inspirations was to change the name "licensee" to "registered user", and thus remove much of the odium attached to this
type of transaction in the earlier English cases. The general effect
of the provisions in the British Act was to enable an owner of a
trade mark to grant a statutory licence to use his mark to another
person without turning over the goodwill of his business, subject to
certain safeguards, while leaving untouched the common law restrictions on licensing of trade marks where confusion or deception actually occurs. The Trade Marks Act 1938 provides:
Section 28(1)-Subject to the provisions of this section, a person other
than the proprietor of a trade mark may be registered
as a registered user thereof in respect of all or any of
the goods in respect of which it is registered (otherwise
than as a defensive trade mark) and either with or without conditions or restrictions.
Section 28(2)-The permitted use of a trade mark shall be deemed to
be use by the proprietor thereof, and shall be deemed
not to be use by a person other than the proprietor, for
the purposes of section twenty-six of this Act and for any
other purpose for which such use is material under this
Act or at common law.

The section also provides for the application for registration
as a registered user and for the specific requirement that, before
registering a person as a "registered user" the Registrar shall be
"satisfied that the use of the trade mark . . . by the registered
user . . . would not be contrary to the public interest." The Act
further provides that the Registrar shall refuse the application
where it appears to tend to facilitate trafficking in a trade mark
(subsection (6)). The Act significantly provides that the registra-
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tion may be cancelled where the registered user has used the trade
mark in such a way as to cause or be likely to cause deception or
confusion (subsection (8) (c)).
It will be seen therefore that provided the owner and the registered user stay within the section the licensing of the registered
(though not of an unregistered) trade mark is now possible in
Britain. Any use made by the registered user is deemed to be use
by the owner and thus everything done by the registered user to
promote and publicize the trade mark operates to benefit the owner,
and all goodwill and reputation connected with the trade mark vest
in the owner. However, the Act enables the registered user to preserve his rights, under the contract between him and the owner,
against infringement by permitting him to call upon the owner to
sue infringers and if he defaults for two months, to commence suit
in his own name, joining the owner as defendant. The effect of
this provision is not clear. It appears that the section does not
intend the registered user to acquire rights in the trade mark. Yet
the registered user is permitted to sue as if he had such rights. In
strict principle his only right would be in contract, against the
owner of the trade mark, and by permitting the registered user to
sue infringers the Act is enabling him to enforce his contractual
right against a third party. However, it seems an eminently sound
and practical provision and avoids some awkward points as to the
quantum of damages which might be raised were a registered user
to attempt to sue the owner on .the contract under these circumstances.
Turning now to the Canadian Trade Marks Act, section 49 contains provisions for a similar type of statutory licence. However, it
is of interest that section 49 contains no provision for the rejection
of the application by the Registrar if it would facilitate trafficking
in the trade mark. Section 50 of the 1953 Act also deals with the
question of licensing of trade marks.
Section 50-The use of a trade mark by a licensee before the coming
into force of this Act and within one year thereafter shall
not be held to invalidate such trade mark if,
(a) the licensing was between related companies; ...
(Section 50 in fact contains two further subsections.)
It will be seen that section 50 is stated negatively and refers to
use of the trade mark by the licensee, and not merely to the existence of rights, as in the British Trade Marks Act. This difference
of approach is thus exhibited both by the assignment provisions and
by the registered user provisions and seems to indicate that the
British draftsmen were more concerned with the existence of rights
in a trade mark, whereas the Canadian draftsmen were concerned
with what use was actually made of the trade mark, and this latter
approach would seem to have much to commend it.
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In two respects the Canadian provisions are somewhat less
strict than the British provisions. By section 28(2) of the British
Trade Marks Act, use by the registered user is "deemed to be use
by the owner for all purposes", and is further "deemed not to be
use by any other person". By section 49(3) of the Canadian Act,
"use by the registered user has the same effect as use by the owner
for all purposes".
It is perhaps unfortunate that the Canadian draftsmen chose
to reword the British section which appears to leave no room for
doubt at all as to its purport. In fact this difference in wording
may leave room for argument that in Canada the registered user
is not entirely precluded from acquiring rights in the trade mark
itself by use quite apart from the contract, whereas the British
provision clearly excludes this possibility. Furthermore, an application for registration of a registered user in Britain must state
whether it is to be a sole registered user or whether there may be
a number of such persons. No such requirement is made in the
Canadian Act. This factor may be important in assisting the Registrar to come to his decision under the public interest provisions, and
if the information is not given he may even be under a misunderstanding as to the relationship, at least until a second application
is made for a second registered user, at which point he can, of
26
course, refuse registration.
Two further questions arise in connection with registered user
agreements. A registered user agreement can only be made in
respect of a registered trade mark. A registered trade mark is itself
liable to be expunged from the register for a number of reasons,
which may have nothing to do with its distinctiveness in relation to
goods. What then is the position of an owner of a registered trade
mark who grants a registered user to another person and that other
person then proceeds to use the trade mark in the manner provided
for a considerable period. At some point an infringer appears, and
the owner sues him for infringement of his registered trade mark.
The infringer succeeds in having the trade mark registration expunged from the register for some technical reason and the owner
is left to seek his remedy at common law for "passing off". Is it
at that point, open to the infringer to say, "The owner has licensed
his unregistered trade mark to another person, and that other
person has used the trade mark, and the unregistered mark therefore lost its distinctiveness." No answer is offered by either the
British or the Canadian Act. There is one possible approach, however, namely that the Registrar of Trade Marks would never consent, under the public interest provisions, to permit a registered
user arrangement which in fact could result in confusion or deception of the public, and therefore, merely because the trade mark
registration is expunged because of some technicality, that by itself
does not render the use of the mark by the registered user deceptive
26
Actomin ProductsLtd.'s Application (1953), 70 R.P.C. 201.
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or confusing. Indeed, if such an argument were put forward, there
is no doubt at all that the defendant would have to prove affirmatively that the public confusion or deception had occurred on a
substantial scale.
The second point arises out of section 50(a) of the Canadian
Act which mentions licensing of a mark between related companies.
This section merely provides that use of a trade mark in exercise
of such a licence before the Act and for one year after the coming
into force of the Act will not invalidate the mark. The inevitable
conclusion is, however, that if such use is continued more than one
year after the Act comes into force then it will be open to the
Court to declare that it has invalidated the trade mark.
This would appear to offer considerable support to the writer's
contention that the purported exception to the common law rule
against licensing, in the case of related or associated companies, is
not good law.
One final word on the registered user provisions, in the Canadian
Act, is that they should be used only with caution. Any attempt to
set up a registered user arrangement should be made only after the
whole association has been examined from the viewpoint of section
49 (10) (c).27 It must always be remembered that these provisions do
not abrogate the common law, either expressly or impliedly, as far
as the validity of the trade mark itself is concerned. The traditional
common law sanction is always available to any trade mark litigant,
namely, that the trade mark in question has been so used by virtue
of the licence, as to create confusion or deception in the public. This
is the very abuse which the early cases were seeking to prevent,
namely trafficking in a trade mark, and there is nothing in the Act
to suggest that the Legislature has now given its approval to this
practice.

27

Sec. 49(10) (c) (i) provides:
The registration of a person as a registered user of a trade mark may
be cancelled . .. by the Exchequer Court of Canada... (where) ...
the registered user has used the trade mark otherwise than by way of the
permitted use, or in such away as to cause, or be likely to cause, deception
or confusion.

